Iraq, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and stability

AN UNCIVIL WAR:

Deadly Neighborly Games



Growing Concerns in Saudi Arabia If you are part of the governing royal family in Riyadh, two developments are to be avoided at all costs. First, you do not want a Shi'ite-dominated Iraqi government in power. Secondly, you do not want an Iraqi alliance with Teheran. The strict Wahabi theology in Saudi Arabia regards the Shi'ites as heretics and fundamentally objectionable. In addition, having a country across your northern border controlled by Shi'ites and influenced by Teheran is a basic security threat.

Some people speculate about how long Abdullah ibn Abdel-Aziz al Sa'ud, who became king and prime minister on 1 August 2005 after the death of HM King Fahd ibn Abdel-Aziz al Sa'ud, can retain power. The royal family is seen as aligned with Washington, D.C., and many fundamentalists view the inroads of Western culture in Saudi Arabia an outcome of this relationship. Social problems and excesses of princes are contributing to growing levels of public frustration with the royal family. Robust economic activity is helping to create more opportunities for Saudi families this year, but this fact is not slowing the conversion of moderate Muslims to extremism, particularly among the impressionable youth.

The Dangerous Game Powerful Saudis are reacting to developments in Iraq and the potential overthrow of the royal family in Riyadh by building alliances with Sunni extremists in Saudi Arabia and providing funds for the Sunni insurgents in Iraq. Their organizations are recruiting jihadis and transporting them to the huge Western Iraqi province of Al Anbar (Majority Sunni, borders with Syria, Jordan and Saudi Arabia). This desert province has become a conduit for supplying Sunni forces and and the staging camps for volunteers. Analysts presume that al-Qaeda has a role in the operation, but it is a fact that necessity is building new relationships. Attempts by the undermanned American forces to stop the flow of materiel and personnel to the Sunni insurgents have been mostly unsuccessful.

During 2004-2005, American troops were the primary protection for the non-Kurd Sunnis in Iraq. Throughout the strife, insurgents from each religious sect have driven civilians from their homes and into refugee camps, which offer some degree of security but but almost no basic necessities. The strengthening of Sunni forces and escalation of fighting has halted the early progress on providing electrical power, water, and other utilities in Iraq.

Conclusion Life in hell, as Time Magazine called the country, is likely to get worse because:

1- Shi'ite Prime Minister Nouri-al-Maliki met with Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in Teheran in mid-September 2006. The rhetoric indicated that an alliance was developing between the present government in Baghdad and Iran. This is a Saudi nightmare.

2- The Sunnis involved in the unofficial civil war on both sides of the Iraqi-Saudi border believe that they have about three more years of the American occupation (until a few months after the January 2009 presidential inauguration). This time must be used to substantially weaken the Iraqi Shi'ite paramilitary forces and infiltrate and intimidate the army and police.

Iraq is the killing ground. Iran is providing arms, intelligence, and selected volunteers to the Shi’ites. The Saudis and others that view this as a pivotal struggle are doing the same for the Sunnis.

Extremists against extremists.

Will they exterminate each other? No, because a long queue of volunteers exists on both sides.



DIRECTOR'S PERSPECTIVE Last Updated 21 September 2006



For media inquiries: Contact Saruhan Hatipoglu (Director of BERI S.A.) at sshatipoglu@beri.com

Copyright 2006 Business Environment Risk Intellegence